G.R. No. 241257 - Dissenting Opinion

G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020,
♦ Decision, Gesmundo, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Peralta, [CJ]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Lopez, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Delos Santos, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT.

I dissent. I vote that the case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the conduct of appropriate proceedings. The accused Brendo P. Pagal (accused) in this case entered a plea of guilty to the crime of Murder against victim Selma Pagal (Selma). The RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the said crime solely on such voluntary plea of guilt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) remanded the case to the RTC for the conduct of further proceedings, particularly for the conduct of a searching inquiry on the voluntariness of accused's plea of guilt as required by Rule 116, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.

The ponente's view is that the accused must be acquitted on the ground that the prosecution failed to present evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. -When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and trill comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.

As correctly observed by the ponente, under Rule 116, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has a three (3)-fold duty in instances where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, including the duty to: (1) conduct a searching inquiry; (2) require the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt and the accused's precise degree of culpability; and (3) allow the accused to present evidence in his behalf. In People v. Tizon,1 the Court explained the importance of the requirements of the searching inquiry under Rule 116, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

This Court has had occasion to state that the requirements of the Rules are mandatory, affording, such as they do, the proper understanding of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be so informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled against him so essential in aptly putting up his defense. The searching inquiry, which must be recorded, requires the court to make it indubitably certain that the accused is fully apprised of the consequences of his plea of guilt. In this case, peculiarly, the court must let the [accused] realize that a plea of guilt will not, under Republic Act No. 7659, affect or reduce the death penalty as he may have otherwise so perceived and come to believe or been advised. Not infrequently, said the Court in one case, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty, and it should compel the judge to make sure that he does not labor under these mistaken impressions. In sum, the searching inquiry under Section 3, Rule 116 must focus on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) a complete comprehension of the legal effects of the plea, so that the plea of guilt is based on a free and informed judgment. So indispensable is this requirement that a plea of guilt to a capital offense can be held null and void where the trial court has inadequately discharged the duty of conducting the prescribed "searching inquiry." (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)

In the case at bar, it has not been clearly established that the RTC performed its duty under the 1987 Constitution and the Rules of Court. Clearly, besides reading the Information in accused's Cebuano-Visayan dialect, there is nothing in the records of the case that would suggest that the RTC: (1) specifically inquired into the voluntariness of accused's plea of guilt; and (2) proved accused's complete comprehension of the legal effects of his plea of guilt to the capital offense of Murder. Considering that the preliminary investigation conducted on accused was marred by a number of irregularities, I respectfully believe that there should have been at least a second or further searching inquiry conducted by the RTC and the accused, who pleaded guilty to the capital offense, should be not acquitted solely on the basis of the failure of the prosecution to produce evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, a further searching inquiry is proper to ensure that the criminal due process requirements under the 1987 Constitution are observed. Any acquittal which does not meet the requirements of the 1987 Constitution is inoperative.

Moreover, upon reviewing the records of the case, it is indeed glaring that the absence of key witness was, in fact, prompted by accused's relation to the private complainant. Notably, I most respectfully agree with Justice Rodil D. Zalameda's observations that accused's plea of guilt and relationship with the private complainant indeed affected the supposed postponements and the absence of the key witness during trial. In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Zalameda observed:

During the preliminary investigation, all of the affiants narrated that they saw the wounded victim, Selma, running away from the accused-appellant, who was then carrying a bloodied bolo. One of them was even attacked by accused-appellant, but managed to run and evade the strike. It is interesting to note that most of these affiants are related to accused- appellant. Private complainant, Angelito Pagal (Angelito), is accused-appellant's brother, while one of the witnesses, Cesar Jarden (Jarden), is Selma's brother, both of whom were not shown to have been impelled by improper motives in implicating accused-appellant. Indeed, if it is unnatural for a relative interested in vindicating a crime done to their family to accuse somebody other than the real culprit, it is even more unlikely for a sibling to accuse his own brother if the latter was truly not involved in the crime. Evidently, the aforesaid circumstances are sufficient to engender a belief that accused-appellant was likely responsible for Selma's death and should be held for trial.

Given the relationship between accused-appellant and private complainant, one has to wonder whether the plea of guilt had affected the prosecution's presentation of its evidence. A reading of the case's records reveals that the cause for the postponement of the prosecution's presentation of evidence was the absence of Selma's widower and private complainant, Angelito. It is not far-fetched to consider that Angelito's absences were based upon his reliance on his own brother's admission of guilt.2

Indeed, it is highly likely that the absence of the key witness was prompted by accused's plea of guilt. Given his relationship with accused, the key witness would surely have considered his testimony as inconsequential considering that accused had already entered his plea of guilt. In People v. Besonia,3 the Court ruled that where the prosecution unduly relied on accused's plea of guilt and that the said plea had already adversely influenced or impaired the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, the remand to the RTC for further proceedings is already imperative, to wit:

Apparently, the trial court and the prosecution unduly relied on Besonia's plea of guilty and his admissions made during the searching inquiry. The prosecution did not discharge its obligation as seriously as it would have had there been no plea of guilt on the part of Besonia. Its presentation of its case was lacking in assiduity that is necessarily expected in a prosecution for a capital offense; it was too meager to be accepted as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life. It has been held that where the plea of guilt to a capital offense has adversely influenced or impaired the presentation of the prosecution's case, the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings is imperative.

Accordingly, a remand to the RTC is clearly necessary in this case to allow the RTC to properly carry out the searching inquiry and implement the provisions of Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution. The remand in this case will correct any potential improvident plea by accused. To repeat, the judgment of acquittal cannot be implemented by the Court since it is clear that the requirements of criminal due process under the 1987 Constitution were not properly observed. Notably, it is not proper to acquit accused due to the prosecution's failure to present evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt on account of the prosecution's flawed reliance on the sufficiency of accused's plea of guilt. The accused must clearly be re- arraigned.

The Rule on the Conduct of a
Searching Inquiry in Cases Where
an Accused Pleads Guilty to a
Capital Offense Must be Revisited.

Indeed, the rule on the conduct of a searching inquiry when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense must also be revisited. Following the Court's ruling in People v. Gambao,4 the specific guidelines on how judges shall conduct a searching inquiry must also be adopted. As pointed out by Justice Zalameda and by the Court in Gambao, the United States' Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides valuable guidance on this matter, to wit:

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court for re-arraignment following the requirements of Rule 116, Section 3 of the Rules of Court and to give the prosecution an opportunity to present evidence against accused Brendo P. Pagal.